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How Civil Society Represents Women:  
Feminists, Catholics, and Mobilization Strategies in Africa
Alice J. Kang
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
In recent years, civil society has risen to speak on behalf of underrepre-sented groups in Africa. In particular, civil society has advocated for the 
representation of women’s interests (Tripp et al. 2008). Yet, relatively lit-
tle is known about the full range of actors who seek the representation of 
women’s interests, mobilize around women’s issues, and articulate specific 
preferences.1 Some of these actors include not only feminists, but also re-
ligious activists who may clash over women’s issues. This gap in knowl-
edge, moreover, extends to non-democratic countries. Who in civil society 
seeks to influence the representation of women’s interests and how, in both 
democratic and authoritarian regimes? What impact do civil society groups 
have on specific policy outcomes? 
This chapter contributes to the volume by addressing the who and how 
questions of women’s representation. It identifies who in civil society can 
potentially mobilize for and against women’s interests and how they try 
to hasten, or delay, policy outcomes. Focusing on the African Union’s Ma-
puto Protocol on the Rights of Women, I find that feminist groups and 
Catholic groups were central actors. These groups employed multilevel 
strategies to gain the government’s attention. Both groups engaged in in-
digitalcommons.unl.edu
1. Following Beckwith (Chapter 2 of this volume), women’s interests are socially and politically con-
structed values. Issues are choices that emphasize components of interest as a policy initiative. Pref-
erences are alternatives on a specific issue.  
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ternational networking and domestic lobbying, protesting, and conscious-
ness-raising activities, though the strategies varied across democracies 
and autocracies. I then find that women’s mobilization helped countries 
ratify the Protocol more quickly, in both democracies and autocracies, but 
find limited evidence that anti-Protocol mobilization slowed down the 
pace of ratification. Thus, this chapter explores Implications 3.1 and 3.2 
from Chapter 1 regarding the importance of the venues in which women 
have representation. 
Who in civil society claims to represent women? 
Though the scholarship on women and politics predominantly focuses 
on women’s groups, they are not the only ones who care about how govern-
ments regulate women’s and men’s lives. Religious actors can also claim to 
represent women’s interests. For instance, Sisters in Islam, an international 
women’s group of Muslim women that advocates for women’s rights, met 
in 2003 to reflect on the challenges that Muslim women’s groups encounter 
“in the face of rising religious extremism” (Othman 2005: xiii). Women’s ac-
tivists from Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, and Morocco lamented that 
states were rejecting policies that would promote women’s rights. Women’s 
activists did not blame “Islam” writ large. This is an important point: Sis-
ters in Islam was not struggling against religion per se. Rather, it identi-
fied specific Islamist political parties, politicians, and civil society groups 
that were mobilizing against proposed policies. Similarly, one study of Sen-
egal argues that “the factor assumed here to be a, if not the, principal force 
restricting the political power of Senegalese women is the importance of Is-
lamic institutions and leaders in Senegalese politics” (Creevey 2006: 154). 
Opposition from civil society to pro-women policy is not limited to Mus-
lim countries. One of the best-studied instances of anti-feminist mobiliza-
tion took place in the United States, when conservative women activists 
mobilized against the Equal Rights Amendment (e.g., Mansbridge 1986; 
Soule and Olzak 2004). As Mazur finds, “[h]igher levels of feminist policy 
were achieved in countries where fundamentalist Christianity was less so-
cially salient and politically influential” (2002: 189). 
To better understand anti-feminist mobilization, scholars have consid-
ered the conditions under which anti-feminist actors succeed in influencing 
the state. One vein of theorizing focuses on pacts. Htun (2003a) compares 
women’s rights policy making across Argentina, Brazil, and Chile under 
military and civilian rule in the 1970s through the 1990s. Htun finds that 
conflict between the state and the Catholic Church in authoritarian Brazil 
and democratic Argentina enabled politicians to vote against the Church’s 
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wishes and to legalize divorce. In authoritarian Brazil, the Catholic Church 
had joined the opposition. In Chile, however, state leaders hesitated to le-
galize divorce. Civilian rulers were loyal to the Church because the Church 
shielded them during the previous dictatorship. 
Economic inequality might facilitate the success of conservative religious 
activism. Blofield (2006) analyzes divorce and abortion reform in Argentina, 
Chile, and Spain. She suggests that class divisions, rather than elite pacts, 
affect the representation of women’s interests. Blofield suggests that in un-
equal societies, organizations like the Catholic Church have more finan-
cial resources than do women’s organizations. Thus, politicians court the 
Church. For instance, Argentina’s former President Carlos Menem sought 
out the Vatican’s support by formulating an anti-abortion agenda. More-
over, in unequal societies, politicians use moral issues to deflect the poor’s 
attention away from their economic woes. Finally, high levels of inequality 
undermine cross-class solidarity within women’s movements. Blofield at-
tributes the absence of legalized abortion in Argentina and Chile partly to 
the fact that middle- and upper-class women can afford to pay for medi-
cal abortions in private clinics, hence the lack of elite women’s mobilization. 
In Spain, relative social equality meant that women’s activists not only had 
access to the media and the political arena through a supportive left-wing 
party, but they also were able to mobilize a broad, multiclass support base 
to lobby for legal abortion. 
A third vein of theorizing differentiates between doctrinal and non -doc-
trinal issues. Htun and Weldon’s (2010) global study of women’s rights pol-
icy suggests that religious leaders and civil society mobilize depending on 
the type of issue, along with other factors such as the political environment. 
Doctrinal issues, such as abortion, contraception, and family law, challenge 
the letter of religion. Non-doctrinal issues, such as maternity leave, work-
place equality, gender quotas, violence against women, and constitutional 
equality, do not challenge the doctrine of organized religion. Htun and Wel-
don contend that if a women’s issue is doctrinal, then religious actors will 
mobilize and challenge women’s rights policy, but if the issue is non-doctri-
nal, then religious actors will not mobilize. 
How civil society claims to represent women 
Civil society groups use several types of strategies to gain their govern-
ment’s attention and influence policy outcomes. These strategies are used 
singly. These strategies are also used in combination, including the combi-
nation of advocacy at the international level with advocacy at the domes-
tic level. 
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International Strategies
 
An important aspect of women’s mobilization for women’s interests is its 
international character. In attending international conferences, workshops, 
and trainings, women from around the world make new friends, share 
ideas, and debate regarding what constitutes women’s interests. Women 
in international arenas also identify and promote new international norms 
to promote women’s interests. The creation of international norms can be 
effective. Scholars have found that governments respond to international 
norms because governments pay attention to what other countries do and 
fear being left out (Wotipka and Ramirez 2008). Additionally, scholars have 
found that governments try to keep up with international women’s rights 
norms in the hopes of attracting foreign aid and favorable trade and lend-
ing agreements (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Hathaway 2002). 
Another strategy that civil society uses to gain government attention and 
influence policy outcomes is to use international law. International treaties 
can bind the hands of government actors and force them to reform domes-
tic laws that undermine women’s interests. Women’s activists were instru-
mental in creating the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. Research 
suggests that governments that ratify CEDAW adopt more women’s rights 
policies than governments that do not (Stetson 1995). Women’s living con-
ditions improve more in countries that have ratified CEDAW than in coun-
tries that have not (Gray et al. 2006). In her landmark study, Beth Simmons 
(2009) finds that, all else being equal, ratifying CEDAW decreases the gen-
der gap in education and increases the likelihood that a government will 
adopt policies that will allow greater access to contraception. 
Another strategy for civil society is to use international courts. System-
atic study shows that through a long, incremental process of “judicial pol-
icy making,” the European Court of Justice expanded the protection of 
women’s pregnancy and maternity leave policy in European Union coun-
tries (Cichowski 2006). Representing a woman who had been enslaved 
most of her life, a coalition of international activists and Nigerien law-
yers went to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Court of Justice to enforce Niger’s 2003 anti-slavery law. The international 
court fined the Nigerien government, and payment was accorded to the 
former slave (Duffy 2009). The ruling is now binding for ECOWAS’s 15 
member states.
 
Domestic Strategies
 
At home, civil society groups use several tactics to advocate for wom-
en’s interests. Civil society groups can lobby government actors to build 
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alliances. They can use newspapers, radio, and television to provide in-
formation to the public and mobilize public opinion. In the Republic of 
Niger, a coalition of women’s activists used the media to call upon the 
constitutional court of Niger to reject political party candidate lists that 
violated Niger’s gender quota in 2004. In that year and subsequent elec-
tion years, the law on candidate lists was enforced (Kang, 2013). Civil so-
ciety groups can also organize demonstrations, at times marching to sites 
of policy making to demand change (e.g., Fallon 2008; Weldon 2011b). 
In 2002, a coalition of women’s activists, with support from UNICEF, 
marched to the seat of the national parliament in Benin. The demonstra-
tors demanded that the parliament review a draft family code, which had 
been stalled for several years. The head of the parliament agreed to make 
family law reform a priority, and the reform was made into law in 2004 
(Kang 2010). 
The Maputo Protocol on the rights of women 
In July 2003, the African Union met in Maputo, Mozambique, and ad-
opted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa, hereafter the Maputo Protocol. The Ma-
puto Protocol is a bold treaty. It identifies a wide variety of African wom-
en’s concerns, from economic equality to reproductive rights to widow’s 
rights. The Protocol further stipulates that women have the right to medical 
abortion in cases of assault, rape, incest, and the endangerment of the moth-
er’s health. It is the first international women’s rights treaty to take such an 
explicit stance on abortion. Catholic civil society groups mobilized against 
the Maputo Protocol, specifically objecting to the abortion clause. 
By the end of 2010, more than half of the countries in the African Union 
(29 out of 53) had ratified the Maputo Protocol (African Union 2011). Eight 
countries ratified the Protocol in 2004 and nine in 2005. Following the fif-
teenth ratification, the Protocol went into effect, in November 2005. The 
number of ratifications in subsequent years then tapered off: three in 2006, 
four in 2007, three in 2008, none in 2009, and two in 2010. 
Strategies used to advocate for the Maputo Protocol 
Women’s activists from across Africa came together early to push for the 
ratification of the Maputo Protocol. Activists employed a multilevel strat-
egy, at the international and domestic levels, in democracies and autoc-
racies. As will be shown below, the need for, and success of, a multilevel 
strategy is evidence in support of Implication 3.2 (see Chapter 1) regarding 
women having a voice in multiple venues. 
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Networking across Borders 
One key strategy for proponents of the Maputo Protocol was to coor-
dinate efforts and share ideas across borders. In 2004, four organizations 
(Equality Now, Fahamu, FEMNET, and Oxfam) created a network of sup-
porters for the Maputo Protocol, called Solidarity for African Women’s 
Rights (SOAWR). The purpose of SOAWR was to mobilize for the Proto-
col’s ratification and implementation. SOAWR’s 16 original organizations 
operated in 12 African countries (see Table 1).2 Since 2004, SOAWR’s mem-
bership has expanded to include 39 organizations. 
Another network of African women’s activists, Women in Law and De-
velopment in Africa (WiLDAF), led by women lawyers and judges, joined 
the movement for the Protocol’s ratification. WiLDAF was created in 1990 
“to promote the development of strategies that link law and development 
to empower women” (Hodgson 2002:4). WiLDAF organizes legal education 
campaigns, provides legal advice to women, and lobbies governments to 
Table 1. Original members of Solidarity for African Women’s Rights (SOAWR), 
2004 
Organization  Country
  Headquarters
1. African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (ACDHRS)  The Gambia
2. African Women’s Development and Communication Network (FEMNET)  Kenya
3. Association des Juristes Maliennes (AJM)  Mali
4. Akina Mama wa Afrika (AMwA)  Uganda
5. Cellule de Coordination sur les Pratiques Traditionelles Affectant la Santé Guinea 
des Femmes et des Enfants (CPTAFE)  
6. Coalition on Violence Against Women (COVAW)  Kenya
7. Equality Now (the Secretariat of the Coalition)  UK, Kenya
8. Fahamu  Senegal
9. Federation of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA-K)  Kenya
10. Oxfam GB  UK
11. Sister Namibia  Namibia
12. Union Nationale des Femmes de Djibouti (UNFD)  Djibouti
13. University of Pretoria - Centre for Human Rights  South Africa
14. Voix de Femmes  Burkina Faso
15. Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF), Zambia  Zambia
16. Women’s Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative (WRAPA)  Nigeria
Sources: E-mail correspondence between Equality Now and author (May 4, 2011) and websites 
of the organizations.
2. I thank Brenda Kombo of Equality Now for providing this information. E-mail correspondence 
with the author, May 4, 2011. 
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reform laws, especially family law. Like SOAWR, WiLDAF brings together 
women’s activists across African borders. It comprises country offices that 
accept applications for individual and group membership. Individual mem-
bership is open to people of any profession, though the majority of indi-
vidual members are women lawyers and judges. Additionally, local groups 
may apply to be affiliated with a WiLDAF country office. These local groups 
vary in topical interest (e.g., Muslim women’s empowerment, female pho-
tojournalists) and are not exclusive to women’s organizations (e.g., devel-
opment NGOs, human rights NGOs). By my count, WiLDAF had offices in 
23 countries when the Protocol became open for ratification (see Table 2). 
Together, SOAWR and WiLDAF spearheaded a serious continental 
movement for the ratification of the Maputo Protocol in democratic and au-
thoritarian countries. In 2003, civil society groups in 25 countries belonged 
to SOAWR or had a national office for WiLDAF.3 Eighteen of those coun-
tries were “free” or “partly free” according to Freedom House in 2003. 
Seven countries were authoritarian or “not free.” 
Lobbying 
Activists mobilized for the ratification of the Maputo Protocol by lob-
bying key political actors. Activists in six countries used this type of strat-
egy (see the quantitative section below for how I gathered this informa-
3. Zimbabwe. which is one of the 25 countries, is not included in the quantitative analysis below due 
to missing data. 
Table 2. Countries with a national office of Women in Law and Development 
in Africa (WILDAF), 2003
1. Benin  13. Namibia
2. Botswana  14. Nigeria
3. Burkina Faso  15. Senegal
4. Cameroon 16. South Africa
5. Cote d’Ivoire  17. Sudan
6. Ghana  18. Swaziland
7. Guinea  19. Tanzania
8. Kenya  20. Togo
9. Lesotho  21. Uganda
10. Mali  22. Zambia
11. Mauritius  23. Zimbabwe
12. Mozambique
Sources: Butegwa (1995), WiLDAF (2001).
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tion). Pro-Protocol activists lobbied a wide range of political actors, from 
ministers to parliamentarians to ambassadors to the African Union to heads 
of state. Activists were reported to have lobbied their country’s ministers 
for the ratification of the Protocol in Kenya, Mali, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
In Mauritania and Niger, activists were reported to have lobbied the pres-
ident. Interestingly, I found relatively few reports of activists lobbying 
members of parliament, with the exception of Niger. This may be due to 
the relative strength of the executive branch over policy making in African 
countries whose parliaments are modeled on British or French parliaments 
rather than the US Congress. In some cases, activists met with multiple po-
litical actors to advocate for the Protocol’s ratification. For instance, the As-
sociation of Malian Women Lawyers (an original member of SOAWR) and 
the minister for the promotion of women in Mali kept each other informed 
about their work on the Protocol. After the cabinet approved the decree for 
the Protocol’s ratification in June 2004, the Association of Malian Women 
Lawyers then directed its efforts to lobbying parliamentarians so that the 
national assembly would approve the decree.4 Mali ratified the Protocol in 
January 2005. In Tanzania, pro-Protocol activists lobbied two different min-
isters: the minister for justice and constitutional affairs and the minister for 
gender, children’s affairs and community development. 5 
Lobbying was more commonly used in democratic and hybrid coun-
tries than in authoritarian countries. Kenya and Mali, which had reports of 
lobbying, were relatively stable democracies throughout the study period. 
Tanzania and Uganda, which are stable hybrid democracies, also had re-
ports of lobbying. Niger saw lobbying and was a relatively stable democ-
racy until 2009, when President Tandja vied for a third term and dissolved 
the Constitutional Court and National Assembly. I found one report of lob-
bying in authoritarian Mauritania, which was nonetheless transitioning to-
ward more competitive rule during the study period. The lack of reports 
of lobbying in “not free” countries may stem from the relative lack of pub-
licly available information about pro-Protocol mobilization in authoritarian 
states. It is plausible that activists in authoritarian states do have access to 
government officials; authoritarian ruling coalitions may seek to address ac-
tivists’ demands to promote the regime’s legitimacy at home and abroad. 
Women’s activists used popular culture to help lobby key officials. 
Drawing on the colors of football penalty cards, SOAWR issued color-
coded pieces of paper to government actors. Green cards signified that 
4. “Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa: Update on Progress,” Pambazuka News 165, July 15, 
2004. Accessed at http://www.pambazuka.orglenlcategory/features/23224 
5. Joshua Ogada. “SOAWR Update on the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa,” Pambazuka 
News 302, May 4, 2007. Accessed at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/wgender/41217  
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the country ratified the Protocol. Yellow cards meant that the country had 
signed but not ratified the treaty. Red cards, given to countries that had 
not signed the Protocol, read: “You have received a red card by the Soli-
darity for African Women’s Rights, a coalition of organizations campaign-
ing for the ratification of the Protocol on the Rights of Women.”6 At Af-
rican Union summits, members of SOAWR issued the cards to country 
representatives, including ministers and heads of state. By 2007, the pen-
alty card campaign became recognizable. When a minister from the Sah-
rawi Arab Democratic Republic received his country’s card, he gladly an-
nounced that his country was now yellow and no longer red.7 SOAWR 
mailed penalty cards as well. Following the August 3, 2005, coup d’état in 
Mauritania, Equality Now sent a letter to the newly installed president, 
with a red card.8 Mauritania ratified the Protocol in September of that 
year. The ratification could have been used to improve the country’s rep-
utation internationally, including among the member states of the African 
Union following the coup d’état. While the president’s concern about Mau-
ritania’s reputation may help account for the country’s ratification of the 
Protocol, the timing of events suggests that lobbying may have been an ef-
fective tactic for pro-Protocol activists. 
Consciousness-Raising Activities 
To raise the public’s awareness of the Maputo Protocol and to mobilize 
public opinion, activists organized a variety of consciousness-raising activ-
ities, from press conferences to workshops to documentary screenings, in 
both democratic and authoritarian states. Taking advantage of the wide-
spread use of mobile phones, the campaign encouraged people to register 
support for the Protocol by sending text messages and to sign up for free 
alerts about the campaign’s progress. As reported by one advocacy orga-
nization, SOAWR received approximately 1,000 requests for text message 
alerts in a six-month period (Fahamu 2005: 7). 
Demonstrations 
Finally, activists also created petitions and organized demonstrations 
to show that the Protocol had popular support. Reports of petitions and 
6. SOAWR Press Release, “Twelve African Leaders Receive Red Cards on Women’s Rights at the Af-
rican Union Summit in Khartoum, Sudan,” January 20, 2006. Emphasis in the original. 
7. Joshua Ogada. “Africa: SOAWR Update on the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa.” Pamba-
zuka 302, May 4,2007. Accessed at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/wgender/41217. 
8. “Women’s Rights Protocol: Challenges of Domestication,” Pambazuka News 222, September 20, 
2005. Accessed at http://www.pambazuka.orglen/issue1222. 
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protests,  however, were relatively rare. Petitions and protests require the 
participation of greater numbers of people and special incentives or con-
ditions to overcome the collective action problem. SOAWR organized an 
online petition. By their count, SOAWR had 3,849 signatures from indi-
viduals in nearly every African country (the exceptions are Chad, Gabon, 
Libya, Madagascar, and Sao Tome and Principe). Individuals signed the 
petition from other countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Turkey, Vietnam, the United Kingdom, and the United States.9 In Dji-
bouti, pro-Protocol activists in 2004 distributed a petition for the ratifica-
tion of the Maputo Protocol and collected 383 signatures in the Protocol’s 
favor.10 I found reports of petitions or protests in three other countries: 
Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In the Republic of Congo, 
women’s civil society groups held a march on International Women’s Day 
in 2010 in which activists called for the Protocol’s ratification.11 In Zimba-
bwe, women’s activists marched in the streets to call for the ratification of 
the Protocol in 2007.12 
Strategies used to oppose the Maputo Protocol 
Just as feminist civil society actors sought to advance women’s interests 
by calling upon their governments to ratify the Maputo Protocol, others 
sought to advance women’s interests by asking their government to not rat-
ify the Protocol. Opponents of the Maputo Protocol used a multilevel strat-
egy in their mobilization against the treaty in democracies and autocracies. 
While some civil society groups opposed the Protocol, mobilization 
against the treaty was not as widespread as support in its favor (see Table 
3). I found reports of public mobilization against the Protocol in nine coun-
tries: Burundi, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Ke-
nya, Madagascar, Niger, Tanzania, and Uganda. Public contestation over 
the Protocol was particularly rare in predominantly Muslim countries. Out 
of 18 predominantly Muslim countries in the African Union, I found reports 
of public opposition to the Protocol in one, the Republic of Niger.13 This 
9. “Petition Signatories.” Accessed at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/petition/signatures.php 
10. “Campaign Update: What’s Happening Around the Continent?” Pambazuka 190, January 20, 2005. 
Accessed at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features126462/print
11. Lydie Gisèle Oko and Yvette Reine Nzaba. “Les Congolaises organisent une marche.” Dépêches de 
Brazzaville, March 9, 2010. 
12. Nqobani Ndlovu. “Women Lawyers Protest over Protocol.” The Standard, December 16, 2007. Ac-
cessed at http://allafrica.com/stories1200712170538.html
13. Predominantly Muslim countries are those where more than 50.1% of the population is Muslim. 
They are Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Libya, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia (Pew Forum 2009). 
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lack of opposition surprised me because in previous research, I examined 
why women mobilized against the Protocol in Niger and found that they 
had rational reasons for doing so (Kang 2010). I expected other neighbor-
ing or predominantly Muslim countries to experience similar kinds of pub-
lic contestation over the Protocol. 
In the remaining eight of the nine countries, Catholic groups opposed the 
Protocol, but there is another surprise here. Opposition does not seem to 
correlate with the percentage of the population that is Catholic (see Table 4). 
For one, opposition from Catholic groups emerged in countries where 
Catholics constitute a minority: Cameroon (39%), Ghana (10%), Kenya 
(30%), Madagascar (20%), and Uganda (35%) (Fox 2004).14 In countries with 
similar proportions of Catholics, such as Benin, Zambia, Lesotho, and Swa-
ziland, I did not find reports of anti-Protocol protests. Second, where Cath-
olics constitute the majority, I found reports of anti-Protocol mobilization in 
two countries (Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo) but not in the 
other two (Cape Verde and Rwanda). The lack of anti-Protocol mobilization 
in Cape Verde and Rwanda can be explained partly by timing: Cape Verde 
and Rwanda ratified the treaty quickly, in 2005 and 2004, respectively. Yet, 
Kenya saw anti-Protocol agitation as early as 2004. The connection between 
Catholicism and anti-Protocol activism is not as simple as one might think.  
Networking across Borders 
Anti-Protocol activists came together outside their countries, as did pro-
Protocol activists. In March 2007, the Standing Committee of the Sympo-
14. Pew Forum (2011) is used to fill in missing information on Cameroon. 
Table 3. Countries with reports of anti-Protocol mobilization, 2003-2010 (month 
and year of first instance)
1. Burundi June 2007
2. Cameroon June 2009
3. Democratic Republic of Congo February 2007
4. Ghana April 2007
5. Kenya September 2004
6. Madagascar December 2007
7. Niger September 2006
8. Tanzania April 2007
9. Uganda January 2006
Sources: AllAfrica.com and Madagascar Tribune.
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sium of Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar (SECAM) met 
in Accra, Ghana. On their agenda was the Maputo Protocol. 15 Speaking 
in Ghana at a press briefing after the meeting, Cardinal Polycarp Pengo of 
Tanzania said, “we admire the efforts of some of the United Nations Com-
mittees, like the International Committee of the Convention for the Elim-
ination of every type of Discrimination Against the Woman (CEDAW),” 
but “we equally denounce the unchallenged pressure they are exerting on 
Countries in Africa.” Pengo asked African leaders to reconsider the Proto-
col: “We respectfully request all the Governments of Africa to remove from 
the Protocol Article 14 # 1, e and 2, c and so defend our African cultural and 
15. “Press Release,” Daily Mail, March 27, 2007. Accessed at http://allafrica.com/sto-
ries/200703270231.html ; “SECAM Committee Discusses Report on Evangelization,” Catholic Infor-
mation Service for Africa, March 27, 2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/200703270681.html  
Table 4. Countries with Catholic minorities and majorities (above 10%)
Country  Percent Catholic
1. Cape Verde 90
2. Burundi 60
3. Rwanda 55
4. Democratic Republic of Congo 50
5. Congo 40
6. Cameroon 39
7. Angola 38
8. Lesotho 38
9. Uganda 35
10. Kenya 30
11. Zambia 28
12. Mauritius 26
13. Central African Republic 25
14. Tanzania 24
15. Benin 21
16. Madagascar 20
17. Togo 20
18. Malawi 20
19. Cote d’Ivoire 20
20. Namibia 18
21. Zimbabwe 16
22. Mozambique 16
23. Ghana 10
24. Swaziland 10
Note: Countries in bold saw anti-Protocol activism.
Sources: Fox (2004). For Cameroon: Pew Forum (2011).
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religious values with regard to the sacredness of life, before the final ratifi-
cation of the Protocol.”16 
Archbishops and bishops from Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and Rwanda reached a similar conclusion at a meeting of the Association of 
the Episcopal Conferences of Central Africa (ACEAC) in June 2007. Out of a 
concern for protecting “African family values” and “women as mothers and 
source of life,” the ACEAC declared that it opposed the article granting Af-
rican women the right to abortion.17 International meetings provided a rea-
son for Catholic leaders to come together and a space for them to identify 
their positions on the Maputo Protocol. 
Lobbying, Consciousness-Raising, and Demonstrations 
Anti-Protocol activists also mobilized on the ground in democracies 
and autocracies. Opponents of the Protocol lobbied political actors to 
sway the government from ratifying the treaty. In Niger, opponents asked 
the government and parliamentarians to refuse to ratify the Protocol. Op-
ponents in Kenya met with President Kibaki to express their disapproval 
in June 2007. Anti-Protocol activists also sought to demonstrate that the 
public was on their side through petitions. In June 2009, activists orga-
nized a petition in Doula, Cameroon, against the Protocol for “legalizing 
homosexuality and abortion.”18 Finally, opponents took to the streets in 
protest against the Maputo Protocol. In July 2009, opponents organized 
a march of silence over Article 14 in Cameroon.19 In Niger, dozens of 
women demonstrated against the Protocol in front of the National Assem-
bly in September 2006.20 
Civil society actors in Africa are mobilizing around women’s interests. 
The question remains: Are women’s activists and their opponents influenc-
ing whether governments represent women’s interests? I address this ques-
tion in the following section with an empirical test. This analysis directly 
16. Isabella Gyau Orhin, “Catholic Bishops Advocate Removal of Abortion Provisions in the African 
Charter,” Public Agenda, April 16, 2007. Accessed at http://allafrica.com/stories/200704161064.
html. 
17. “Le droit à l’avortement de femmes en Afrique: Les Evêques du Burundi, RDC et Ruanda 
s’opposent au Protocole de Maputo,” La Prospérité. June 21. 2007. Accessed at http://fr.a1lafrica.
com/stories/200706210465.html. 
18. Note that the Protocol does not make reference to homosexuality. Pierre-Marie Djongo. “De Ma-
puto—Le rôle trouble de la France,” Le Messager, July 1, 2009. Accessed at http://fr.a1lafrica.com/
storiesI200907010578.html. 
19. Eric Vincent Fomo. “Avortement—Quand le protocole de Maputo anime le débat,” Cameroon Tri-
bune, July 13, 2009. Accessed at http://fr.a1lafrica.com/stories/200907130874.html. 
20. Laoual Sallaou Ismaël. “Les femmes musulmanes interpellent le gouvernement.” Roue de l’histoire. 
September 13, 2006. 
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addresses Proposition 3, presented in Chapter 1, regarding the different 
and multiple venues in which policy is made by government. 
Does civil society influence the ratification of the Maputo Protocol? 
In this section, I analyze whether civil society groups affected the speed 
of the Protocol’s ratification in 47 countries.21 The dependent variable is 
the likelihood of country i ratifying the Maputo Protocol on the Rights of 
Women in year t (African Union 2011). The unit of observation is the coun-
try-year. In the data set, a country is included while it is “at risk” of expe-
riencing the event. Once a country ratifies the Protocol, it exits the data set. 
All countries enter the data set in 2003, the year the Protocol first became 
open for ratification. The study period ends in 2010. I use Cox proportional 
hazard models, which allows me to estimate the effects of covariates on du-
ration time without parameterizing time-dependency. Because Cox models 
assume that the effect of each covariate is constant, i.e., proportional, over 
time, I look for violations of the proportionality assumption by calculating 
scaled Schoenfeld residuals for each covariate.22 
The central independent variables are mobilization for and mobilization 
against the Protocol. Mobilization for the Protocol equals 1 once a national 
newspaper or international news wire reports that a societal actor advo-
cated for the ratification of the Maputo Protocol, and 0 otherwise. For in-
stance, for Uganda, I marked that mobilization started in 2007. A Ugandan 
newspaper reported that Akina Mama wa Afrika said they discussed the 
Protocol’s ratification with a gender minister.23 I found reports by conduct-
ing a search on AllAfrica.com’s database for the following combinations of 
keywords: < Protocol> <women> <rights>; < Charter> <women> <rights>; 
< Maputo> <women> <rights>. For countries with no national newspa-
pers in AllAfrica.com’s database, I searched national newspapers’ websites 
by using the “Search within a site or domain” specification in Google’s ad-
vanced search. The data collection included newspapers in English, French, 
Portuguese, and Spanish. Using this search method, I find reports of pro-
Protocol mobilization in 23 countries between July 2003 and December 
2010. Fifteen of the 23 ratified the Protocol. Mobilization against the Protocol 
21. Morocco is excluded from the study because it was not a member of the African Union during the 
study period. Libya, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, and Zimbabwe are excluded due 
to missing data. South Sudan was not a state until 2011 and is not included. 
22. The results concerning mobilization remain substantively similar when using Weibull event his-
tory models. 
23. Geresom Musamali. “Kadaga Appeals to Govt Over Women Rights Law.” New Vision, August 9, 
2007. Accessed at http://allafrica.com/stories/200708100088.html . 
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equals 1 once a national newspaper or international news wire reports that 
a societal actor moved against the ratification of the Maputo Protocol, and 
0 otherwise. I find reports of anti-Protocol mobilization in nine countries. 
Of those nine, five countries ratified the Protocol (Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda). 
Because measuring mobilization through newspapers has limitations 
(Earl et al. 2004), I also use an organization-based measure of mobiliza-
tion as an alternative proxy. This measure follows Soule and Olzak (2004), 
who used the presence of an in-state chapter of the American Association 
of University Women, an organization that explicitly backed the ERA’s rat-
ification, as a proxy for pro-ERA mobilization. SOAWR-WiLDAF equals 1 
if, in 2003, there was an in-country office of Solidarity for African Wom-
en’s Rights (SOAWR) or of Women in Law and Development in Africa 
(WiLDAF), and 0 otherwise (Butegwa 1995; WiLDAF 2001; author commu-
nication with SOAWR). I chose to examine membership in SOAWR and 
WiLDAF in 2003 due to data availability. (Some countries did open an of-
fice later.) Twenty-four African countries had a national chapter of one or 
both of the pro-Protocol networks in 2003. 
The models include six control variables. Women in Parliament is the per-
centage of women in the lower house of the national legislature or in the 
unicameral parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2011). Women in Parlia-
ment ranges from 0 (Comoros in 2003) to 48.75 (Rwanda in 2004), with an 
average of 13.08%. Women in parliament may also represent women’s in-
terests (Escobar-Lemmon et al., Chapter 11 of this volume; Kittilson 2008; 
Reingold and Haynie, Chapter 10 of this volume; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; 
Swers, Chapter 9 of this volume). I expect that as the percentage of women 
in parliament increases, the speed of ratification increases. 
Two controls take into account the country’s political opportunity struc-
ture (see Beckwith, Chapter 2 of this volume). To control for regime type, I 
use Level of Democracy as measured by the Polity IV Project (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2010). Democracy ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democ-
racy). In this study’s sample, Level of Democracy ranges from -9 (Swaziland, 
all years) to 10 (Mauritius, all years). The average across all years and coun-
tries is 0.97. As Level of Democracy increases, I expect the pace of ratification 
to increase. This is because autocrats may support pro-women’s rights in 
theory, but may undermine women’s rights in practice. This false support 
for women’s interests in autocracies is known as “First ladies syndrome,” 
“wifeism,” and “femocracy” (Abdullah 1995; Ibrahim 2004; Mama 1997; 
Okeke 1998; Tsikata 1998). Democracies, however, may be slow to ratify the 
Protocol as well. If the space for democratic debate is closed (Walsh 2010), 
then one would expect democratically elected governments to be slow at 
ratifying the Protocol. Further, the most organized and sustained anti-Pro-
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tocol movements arose in the democracies of Kenya and Niger. Kenya rati-
fied the Protocol relatively late, in 2010. 
To control for regime ideology, Left Leader or Government equals 1 if the 
country’s leader or ruling party is Left-leaning, and 0 otherwise (Beck et al. 
2001). Out of 265 country years, a Left-leaning president or government was 
in power in 67 years. Countries that had leftist rule while they were at risk 
are Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Libya, Mo-
zambique, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia. 
Some countries become Left-leaning over time, such as Guinea-Bissau and 
Sierra Leone. I expect that ratification occurs more quickly when a Left-lean-
ing government is in power. Scholars have shown that Left-leaning lead-
ers in democracies and autocracies are more likely to adopt gender quotas 
and gender equality policies (Caul 2001; Charrad 2001; Htun 2003a; Tripp 
and Hughes n.d.), though Left party rule does not always translate into the 
adoption of other types of women-friendly policies (Htun and Power 2006; 
Kittilson 2008; Mazur 2002: 189, 197). I expect Left-leaning governments to 
ratify the Protocol more quickly in democracies and autocracies. 
The fourth control variable addresses external incentives. Foreign Aid is 
the natural log of net official development assistance per capita in current 
US dollars in the previous year (World Bank 2011). Foreign Aid ranges from 
-2.30 to 6.00, with an average of 3.57. A government might ratify the Proto-
col to demonstrate to foreign governments and international organizations 
its commitment to liberalism. I expect ratification to happen more quickly 
when governments rely more on foreign aid. In alternative models not pre-
sented here, I include other proxies for foreign incentives, such as whether 
there is a liberalizing United Nations peacekeeping force in the country 
(Bush 2011). 
Finally, I control for religious demographics and wealth. Catholic is the 
percentage of the country that is Catholic (Fox 2004; Pew Forum 2011). Cath-
olic varies from 0 to 90, and the mean is 15.95. Alternative models examine 
the hypothesis that predominantly Muslim countries are less open to inter-
national women’s rights norms (Fish 2002, 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003; 
Poe et al. 1997). The percentage of Muslims in the country does not nega-
tively influence the likelihood of ratification. GDP per Capita is the natural 
log of gross domestic product per capita of the previous year (World Bank 
2011). The natural log of GDP per capita varies from 5.52 to 10.36, with an 
average of 7.46. Modernization theorists posit that post-industrial coun-
tries are more open toward norms of gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 
2003). According to the modernization hypothesis, higher levels of wealth 
should have a positive influence on the ratification of the Protocol. 
Table 5 reports the results in terms of hazard ratios. Hazard ratios esti-
mate the change in odds of policy adoption given a one-unit change in the 
independent variable. When hazard ratios are greater than 1, this suggests a 
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faster pace of ratification. Hazard ratios less than one indicate a slower pace 
of ratification. The results show that the mobilization of women’s activists 
increases the pace at which the government ratifies the Maputo Protocol. 
The baseline model in Table 5 does not include mobilization. The po-
litical opportunity structure seems to matter. The hazard ratio for Women 
in Parliament is greater than one, as expected. The higher the level of de-
mocracy, the faster the country is likely to ratify the Protocol. Countries ap-
pear to be at greater risk of ratifying the Protocol more quickly if there is a 
Left-leaning leader or government in power. Contrary to our expectations, 
higher levels of dependence on foreign aid does not correlate with a faster 
pace of ratifying the Protocol. Note as well that the percentage of the coun-
try that is Catholic and level of GDP per capita do not appear to influence 
the ratification of the Protocol.  
Table 5. The determinants of the ratification of the African Union Maputo 
Protocol, 2003-2010 (Cox event history analysis)
Variables   Baseline   Mobilization   Democracies  Autocracies
           Model   Model   Only Model   Only Model
Mobilization for the   3.9910***  3.6480**  5.3687*
    Protocol   (1.6395)  (2.2562)  (3.4840)
Mobilization against    1.7204   1.5607  2.2204
    the Protocol   (1.3775)  (1.4390)  (1.9599)
Women in Parliament  1.0425*   1.0474*   .9683  1.0601
 (.0258)  (.0262)  (.0435)  (.0391)
Level of Democracy  1.1196**  1.0992**
 (.0500)  (.0465)
Left Leader or  1.9300*   1.6782  8.2457***  .7882
    Government  (.7070)  (.7294)  (5.2831)  (.4306)
Foreign Aid  1.0031   1.1664
 (.2639)  (.3636)
Catholic  .9973   1.0008
 (.0096)  (.0105)
GDP per Capita  .8124   .8576
 (.1483)  (.1471)
Log pseudolikelihood  -84.3845  -78.4896  -22.9654  -37.0800
Number of countries  47  47  17  30
Number of failures  26  26  12  14
Observations  265  265  81  184
Hazard ratios are estimated using the Efron method for ties. Robust standard errors, clustered 
by country, in parentheses. * p < 0.10 ; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01
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What happens when we include activism for and against the Protocol? I 
find a strong relationship between women’s activism and the Protocol’s rat-
ification (Table 5, second column). When women’s advocates publicly call 
on their governments to ratify the Maputo Protocol, governments are sig-
nificantly faster to ratify the Protocol. Religious opposition to the Protocol, 
by contrast, does not appear to be effective. This may be due to the rela-
tively late timing of opposition. The earliest instance of opposition against 
the Protocol I found was in a September 2004 speech at a seminar on wom-
en’s rights in Nairobi. Mirugi Kariuki, assistant minister of foreign affairs, 
who would later become a parliamentarian and human rights advocate, “la-
mented that [Kenya] had not ratified the pact,” which was “being criticized 
by religious organizations because it included abortion.”24 Kenya aside, the 
majority of anti-Protocol activity took place after the Protocol entered into 
force. In robustness tests, the variable for Women in Parliament does not con-
sistently obtain significance at the .10 level. The degree to which a country 
is democratic is important for the pace of ratification. 
The last two models split the countries into democracies and autocracies 
to examine whether pro- and anti-Protocol activism influences the speed of 
the Protocol’s ratification under different regimes. Countries that scored a 
six or higher from the Polity IV Project in 2003, 2004, or 2005 were coded as 
democracies. The results in the last two columns should be interpreted with 
care, given the relatively small number of countries and observations in the 
models. Results for the first group, democracies, are shown in the third col-
umn of Table 5. The importance of women’s activism on the pace of rati-
fication remains strong. Mobilization against the Protocol does not appear 
to significantly affect the speed of ratification in democracies. Within de-
mocracies, countries with Left-leaning leaders and governments are signif-
icantly faster to ratify the Protocol. Contrary to my expectation, Left-lean-
ing governments in autocratic regimes do not appear to be faster to ratify 
the Protocol. Among autocracies, governments are also quicker to ratify the 
Protocol when there is women’s activism for the treaty, including in alter-
native models where I include foreign aid and GDP as control variables, 
neither of which are significantly related to the time it takes governments 
to ratify the Protocol. Again, the findings are preliminary, given the limited 
number of cases in the split samples. 
Women’s activism is the only explanatory variable in Table 5 that has a 
strong and consistent relationship across different models. This finding 
holds in a variety of robustness checks. The importance of women’s activ-
ism holds when the models use an alternative measure of women’s activism, 
SOAWR-WiLDAF (models not shown). The impact of women’s mobilization 
24. “Equality Bill to Go Back to Parliament,” Daily Nation, September 21, 2004. Accessed at http://al-
lafrica.com/stories/200409210073.html. 
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on the Maputo Protocol holds when the models replace a dichotomous mea-
sure of Muslim-majority population with a continuous variable (Pew Forum 
2009). Different sources sometimes produce different lists of Muslim-major-
ity countries, so I alternatively use Fish’s (2002) and Fox’s (2004) lists. Others 
have found that it is not religion per se, but state-church relations that influ-
ence women’s rights reforms (Simmons 2009). Therefore, I include a mea-
sure of state religion (Fox 2004). To assess whether large oil rents create a 
structural impediment for the enjoyment of women’s rights (Ross 2008), I 
add a variable measuring net oil and gas exports as a percentage of Gen-
der-related Development Index (GDI) to the models (World Bank 2011). The 
central findings about the effect of pro-Protocol mobilization remain sub-
stantively similar.25 Finally, leverage analysis suggested that Burkina Faso, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania are outliers. 
When these countries are excluded one at a time, pro-Protocol mobilization 
remains a positive and significant influence on the Protocol’s ratification. 
Implications of the study
 
This chapter has provided an empirical analysis of who in civil society 
claims to represent women’s interests and how civil society groups seek to 
influence policy outcomes. Civil society groups employ a variety of strat-
egies over time and across the continent, which is evidence in support of 
Implication 3.2 from Chapter 1: success in realizing the translation of pref-
erences into policy is greater when women have an influential voice in mul-
tiple venues. 
Implications for Who Represents Women’s Interests
 
One implication of this study is that a wide range of actors outside the 
state are actively involved in the representation of women’s interests. I find 
that women’s activism is the strongest determinant of the timing of ratifi-
cation. Women’s activism appears to matter more than the proportion of 
women in parliament, though in two out of the four models, Women in Par-
liament gains statistical significance. It is possible that this study’s measure 
of women’s representation does not adequately measure the substantive 
importance of female parliamentarians or female cabinet members, who 
may serve as crucial allies for women’s groups. 
Future work should examine not just the percentages of women in of-
fice or in cabinet, but whether and when women in office and in cabinet 
25. Future research could examine why some countries ratified the Protocol with reservations, but the 
African Union has not released such information. 
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form alliances with women’s groups. Dahlerup (Chapter 4 of this vol-
ume) argues that movements have to work to build a common ground, 
and makes a similar call for research that examines the conditions under 
which women from multiple venues form coalitions and work together. 
The anecdotal evidence suggests that these alliances matter. Indeed, many 
of the women’s activists involved in promoting the Protocol were judges 
and ministers, who include women and men. As Maria Escobar-Lemmon 
et al. (Chapter 11 of this volume) find, male ministers do propose bills that 
seek to advance women’s interests; male members of cabinet may serve as 
important allies for civil society. This analysis thus can be interpreted to 
provide support for Implication 3.1 —access to the right venue is critical 
for the ability of representatives of women’s interests to change policy— 
but it also indicates the need for more investigation of the factors that 
make a venue the “right venue.” Only further research can tell us whether 
and under what conditions women in African parliaments and women in 
African cabinets are substantive representatives. Thus far, case study ev-
idence goes in both directions (e.g., Beck 2003; Goetz and Hassim 2003; 
Hassim 2006; Tripp et al. 2008). 
A second implication from this study is that civil society groups some-
times but not always conflict over women’s issues. I was surprised by the 
relative lack of public debate over the issue of abortion and other poten-
tially contentious issues, such as the age of marriage and polygamy, in the 
Maputo Protocol. Perhaps my surprise stems from the context in which I 
live, in the United States, where debates over abortion and contraception 
seem perennial. As Hancock (Chapter 3 of this volume) argues, race, ethnic-
ity, gender, and other markers including religion are not static or homoge-
nous categories. Let me be clear that I do not claim that African women en-
joy free access to reproductive health; women face real hurdles in obtaining 
quality health care. Rather, I suggest that scholars further study the condi-
tions in which opposing groups emerge. Africa provides a rich and diverse 
terrain in which to study the representation of women’s interests-both who 
seeks to represent women’s interests, and how they try to do so. 
Implications for How the Representation of Women Occurs 
A final implication from this study is that advocacy for women’s inter-
ests is happening at multiple levels. Transnational networking is being 
employed by advocates and opponents. Advocates and opponents of the 
Maputo Protocol formulated and articulated their policy preferences in in-
ternational arenas. Thus far, scholars have examined how transnational net-
working advances the representation of women’s interests (e.g., Keck and 
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Sikkink 1998; True and Mintrom 2001). This chapter finds that much of the 
opposition to the Maputo Protocol came from groups in the transnational 
network of the Catholic Church. This suggests that the more conservative 
religious groups meet internationally, the more opportunities they have to 
discuss and claim to represent women’s interests. 
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